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This Policy Discussion Paper summarizes the papers that were presented at the 
Liquidity in Frictional Markets conference in November  2008. The papers, which looked 
at markets for assets as diverse as houses, bank loans, and electronic funds transfer, all 
explored that amorphous concept called “liquidity” and how its presence—or absence—
affects the economy.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Introduction 
On November 14-15, 2008, a group of distinguished scholars met in the conference room of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s Learning Center and Money Museum to discuss issues relat-
ing to “Liquidity in Frictional Markets.” Th   e conference was cosponsored by the Journal of Mon-
ey, Credit, and Banking. Th   e papers, which looked at markets for assets as diverse as houses, bank 
loans, and electronic funds transfer, all explored that amorphous concept called “liquidity” and 
how its presence—or absence—aﬀ  ects the economy. Th   e papers also shared a methodological per-
spective, using search, network, and game theories as alternatives to Walrasian market clearing. 
Monetary Policy
Th   ree papers focused on monetary policy.
In “Elastic Money, Inﬂ  ation, and Interest Rate Policy,” Allen Head and Junfeng Qiu study 
optimal monetary policy in an environment in which money plays a basic role in facilitating 
exchange, while aggregate shocks aﬀ  ect households asymmetrically and exchange may be con-
ducted using either bank deposits (inside money) or ﬁ  at currency (outside money). A central 
bank controls the stock of outside money in the long run and responds to shocks in the short run 
using an interest rate policy that manages private banks’ creation of inside money and inﬂ  uences 
households’ consumption. Th   e zero bound on nominal interest rates prevents the central bank 
from achieving eﬃ   ciency in all states. Long-run inﬂ  ation can improve welfare by mitigating the 
eﬀ  ect of this bound.
In “Price-Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy” Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher 
Waller construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary sta-
bilization policy. Prices are fully ﬂ  exible, and money is essential for trade. Th   eir main result is that 
if the central bank pursues a price-level target, it can control inﬂ  ation expectations and improve 
welfare by stabilizing short-run shocks to the economy. Th   e optimal policy involves smoothing 
nominal interest rates, which eﬀ  ectively smoothes consumption across states.
Nicolas L. Jacquet and Serene Tan, in “Money, Bargaining, and Risk Sharing,” investigate 
money’s dual role as a self-insurance device and a means of payment, when perfect risk-sharing 
is not possible and the two roles of money are disentangled. Th  ey use a variant of Lagos and 
Wright’s approach (2005), where agents face a risk in the centralized market as follows. In the 
decentralized market, the main role for money is as a means of payment, while in the centralized 
market it is a self-insurance device. Th   e authors show that state-contingent inﬂ  ation rates can im-
prove agents’ ability to self-insure in the centralized market, thereby improving the terms of trade 
in the decentralized market. Th   e authors also characterize the optimal monetary policy.
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Payments Systems
Four papers focused on the payments system and the nuts and bolts of the monetary system.
 In “Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design,” Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed 
Nosal describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is diﬃ   cult to 
monitor. Th   e approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mecha-
nism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. Th   ey show that it is not 
eﬃ   cient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. Th   ey do this without appealing to lottery 
devices, and argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.
Adam Ashcraft, James McAndrews, and David Skeie consider “Precautionary Reserves and 
the Interbank Market.” Liquidity hoarding by banks and extreme volatility of the federal funds 
rate was widely seen as having severely disrupted the interbank market and the broader ﬁ  nancial 
system during the 2007–08 ﬁ  nancial crisis. Using a dataset of intraday Federal Reserve bank 
account balances and Fedwire interbank transactions, the authors estimate all overnight federal 
funds trades during this time period. Th   ey document the extreme federal funds rate volatility that 
occurred and provide empirical evidence on banks’ precautionary hoarding of reserves and reluc-
tance to lend. Th   e authors then develop a model with credit and liquidity frictions in the inter-
bank market consistent with the empirical results. Banks rationally hold excess reserves intraday 
and overnight as a precautionary measure to self-insure against liquidity shocks. Th   e intraday fed 
funds rate sometimes spikes above the discount rate and falls near zero. Apparent anomalies dur-
ing the crisis may be explained as the stark but natural outcomes of the authors’ general model of 
the interbank market. Th   e model also provides a uniﬁ  ed explanation for previously documented 
stylized facts and makes new predictions for the interbank market.
In “Systemic Risk and Liquidity in Payment Systems,” Gara M. Afonso and Hyun Song Shin 
study liquidity and systemic risk in high-value payment systems. Flows in such high-value sys-
tems are characterized by high velocity, meaning that the total amount paid and received is high 
relative to the stock of reserves. In such systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to ﬁ  nance 
outgoing payments, necessitating a high degree of coordination and synchronization. Th  ey  use 
lattice-theoretic methods to solve for the unique ﬁ  xed point of an equilibrium mapping and con-
duct comparative statics analyses on changes to the environment. Banks that attempt to conserve 
liquidity actually increase the demand for intraday credit and, ultimately, cause a disruption of 
payments. Additionally, when a bank is identiﬁ  ed as vulnerable to failure and other banks cancel 
payments to that bank, there are systemic repercussions.
Ricardo Lagos formulates a search-based asset-pricing model in which both equity shares and 
ﬁ  at money can be used as means of payment in “Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy in 
an Exchange Economy.” It is then possible for him to characterize a family of optimal stochastic 
monetary policies. Every policy in this family implements Friedman’s prescription of zero nomi-
nal interest rates. Under an optimal policy, equity prices and returns are independent of monetary 
considerations. Th   e paper also studies a perturbation of the family of optimal policies that targets 
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a constant but nonzero nominal interest rate. Under such policies, the average real return on 
equity is negatively correlated with the average inﬂ  ation rate.
Trading Frictions in Asset Markets
Four papers looked at trading frictions in asset markets, continuing an inﬂ  uential recent trend to 
use search models to examine market microstructure.
Like Lagos, Yong Kim, in “Liquidity and Selection in Asset Markets with Search Frictions,” 
also looks at an asset market subject to search frictions, but one in which both asset liquidity and 
market composition are determined endogenously. Th   e analysis predicts that higher asset prices 
resulting from exogenously higher asset earnings imply a: 
Shorter search duration for sellers (higher liquidity) • 
Shorter owner tenure before listing assets for resale (turnover) • 
Higher stock of buyers • 
Higher share of the asset stock traded (trade volume) • 
Asset price-earnings ratios respond positively to earnings because liquidity premiums respond 
to the size of earnings relative to the costs of search. Kim shows that liquidity eﬀ  ects and selection 
eﬀ  ects reinforce each other in the presence of search frictions.
In “Liquidity Provision in Capacity-Constrained Markets” Pierre-Olivier Weill studies a com-
petitive, dynamic ﬁ  nancial market subject to a transient selling pressure, when market makers 
face a capacity constraint on the number of trades they can make with outside investors. Th  is 
induces market makers to provide liquidity in order to manage their capacity constraint optimally 
over time: Th   ey use slack capacity early to accumulate assets when the selling pressure is strong, 
so as to relax their capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when the selling pressure 
subsides. When the capacity constraint binds, the bid-ask spread is strictly positive, widening and 
narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories. Since the equilibrium asset 
allocation is constrained Pareto optimal, the time variations in bid-ask spreads are not symptom-
atic of ineﬃ   cient liquidity provision.
In “Trading Frictions and House Price Dynamics,” Andrew Caplin and John Leahy construct 
a model capable of explaining much of the recent experience in the housing market. Th  eir  model 
of trade with matching frictions provides a simple characterization for the process through which 
sales and inventory determine housing prices. Th   ey then compare the implications of the model 
to certain properties of housing markets and ﬁ  nd it can explain the large price changes and the 
positive correlation between house prices and sales found in the data. Unlike the data, prices are 
negatively autocorrelated, and high inventory predicts price appreciation. Th   ey also investigate 
several amendments to the model.
Christophe Chamley and Celine Rochon, in “When Banks Lend for too Long,” explore a 
model of lending in which the decision between rolling over or terminating a loan is the result of 
a privately eﬃ   cient debt contract under imperfect information. Loans are established in matches 
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between banks (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers), who meet in a search process. Projects 
randomly turn out a quick payout or a long-term payout that requires a rollover of the loan. Th  e 
model generates, under proper parameter conditions, multiple steady states, and a small monitor-
ing cost may generate a large macroeconomic eﬀ  ect. Th   e model is simpliﬁ  ed for the analysis of the 
dynamics. Th   ere is a continuum of cycles that are separated by crises, in which the stock of loans 
is reduced by a quantum amount of loan terminations. 
Money, Liquidity, and Banks
Th   ree papers explored the subtle relationships between money, liquidity, and banks. 
“Information, Liquidity, and Asset Prices” by Benjamin Lester, Andrew Postlewaite, and Ran-
dall Wright studies how recognizability aﬀ  ects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like 
U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock 
certiﬁ  cates, bonds, or foreign currency. Th   is idea is common in monetary economics, but previ-
ous models deliver equilibria where less-recognizable assets are always accepted with positive 
probability, never zero probability. Th  is is inconvenient when prices are determined through 
bargaining, which is diﬃ   cult with private information. Th   ese authors construct models in which 
agents outright reject assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Th  us,  infor-
mation frictions generate liquidity diﬀ  erences without overly complicating the analysis.
In “Uncertainty, Inﬂ  ation, and Welfare,” Jonathan Chiu and Miguel Molico use a micro-
founded search-theoretic monetary model to study the welfare costs and redistributive eﬀ  ects 
of inﬂ  ation when there is idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Th  ey calibrate the model to match the 
empirical aggregate money demand and the distribution of money holdings across households, 
and study the eﬀ  ects of inﬂ  ation under the implied degree of market incompleteness. In the 
presence of imperfect insurance, the estimated long-run welfare costs of inﬂ  ation are on average 
40 percent smaller than in a complete-markets, representative-agent economy. Furthermore, in-
ﬂ  ation induces important redistributive eﬀ  ects across households. For example, the welfare gains 
of reducing inﬂ  ation from 10 percent to 0 percent is 0.59 percent of income. Moreover, the 
marginal redistributive eﬀ  ect of inﬂ  ation is decreasing in the rate of inﬂ  ation. Th   ey conclude that 
accounting for wealth eﬀ  ects is important for the measurement of the welfare costs of inﬂ  ation, 
given that these eﬀ  ects are quantitatively signiﬁ  cant. 
Valerie R. Bencivenga and Gabriele Camera, in “Banks, Liquidity Insurance, and Interest 
on Reserves in a Matching Model of Money,” introduce banks resembling those in Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) into a model of money and capital based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and 
Aruoba and Wright (2003). Agents can self-insure against random liquidity needs by carrying 
money balances, but they can also withdraw money from their bank deposits, although there is a 
real resource cost of doing so. Banks create liquidity by pooling agents’ savings and by holding a 
portfolio of primary assets (money and capital) that maximizes depositors’ expected utility. From 
an agent’s perspective, banks provide liquidity insurance; they reduce or eliminate unused money 
balances. In the aggregate, banks shift the composition of savings toward investment in physical 
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capital, which increases agents’ rate of return on their savings. Th   us, banks have the potential to 
improve welfare, despite their cost. When the withdrawal cost is suﬃ   ciently small, agents save 
only through deposits, and banks provide complete liquidity insurance (there are no unused 
money balances). When the cost is moderate, agents optimally combine self-insurance (agents 
carry some money) and liquidity insurance through banks (some agents make withdrawals, and 
banks hold reserves). Th   e optimal contract has a nonlinear schedule of interest rates on deposits in 
this case. When the cost is large, liquidity insurance becomes prohibitively expensive, and banks 
cannot improve welfare. Th  e threshold levels of the cost are increasing in the inﬂ  ation rate. A 
policy of paying interest on reserves can reverse some or all of the distortionary eﬀ  ects of inﬂ  ation, 
provided the withdrawal cost is suﬃ   ciently small, by inducing banks to oﬀ  er speciﬁ  c incentive-
compatible deposit contracts. Banks cannot observe agents’ liquidity needs, and therefore deposit 
contracts cannot condition on them.
Th  e conference covered a broad range of papers in terms of techniques used, questions ad-
dressed, and markets investigated. Perhaps the broad message of these papers is that a deeper 
understanding of market mechanisms and the frictions that lead to them can yield insights that 
are surprisingly relevant for policy questions.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 26, MAY 2009
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